PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

Against the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals
of New York decides in Bandman v. Finn, 78 N. E. 175,
that where defendant by a written .contract
agreed to pay plaintiff's assignor for a release
of a certain claim $iooo on the passing of title to certain
premises, and $86oo on the completion of a roof of a contemplated building on the premises, and afterwards, before
the roof was completed, they entered into an agreement
whereby defendant agreed to pay $25oo for the release of
the claim and the surrender of the prior agreement, the subsequent agreement was binding, though not executed.
Compare Jafrey v. Davies, 124 N. Y. 164; 1i L. R. A. 710.

ANIMALS.

The Superior Court of Delaware decides in Harrington
v. Hall, 63 Atl. 875, that a person is not justified in injuring
or killing a dog which merely trespasses upon
T,,,s ,
his premises, though notices have been posted
forbidding trespassing. Where, however, defendant shot
plaintiff's dog while plaintiff's dog was on defendant's
premises killing defendant's turkeys, it was held that defendant's act was justifiable.
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ASSIGNMENT.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina decides in Loan
& Savings Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 54 S. E.
364, that a check on a bank operates as an
atoo
Checksassignment pro tanto of the drawer's deposit
Effect
account, and there is privity between the bank
having the necessary funds on hand and the checkholder
on presentation of the check for payment, so as to give the
holder a right of action against the bank for wrongfully
refusing to pay it. It is further held that the drawer of
a check cannot countermand its payment, if the check has
passed into the hands of a bona fide holder, by notifying the
bank that the check was obtained by fraud and that there
was a failure of consideration. Compare Union Nat. Bank
v. Oceana Co., 8o Ill. 212.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

The Supreme Court of Illinois decides in Chicago & S.
Traction Company v. Flaherty, 28 N. E. 29, that unless
a client authorizes his attorney to employ assistEmp loying
Assistant
ant counsel, he is not liable for the fees of such
assistant counsel. Compare Price v. Hay, 132 Ill. 543.

BANKRUPTCY.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit, decides in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham, I45
Fed. 809, that the provision of the Bankruptcy
m t Ceam: Act of 1898 limiting the time for proving claims
to one year has reference to the. bankruptcy
proceedings alone, and if the claim of a creditor, who is
also a debtor, of the estate is one provable in its nature, the
fact that he has not proved it within the year does not affect
his right to plead it as a set-off or counter claim in an action
by the trustee to recover his indebtedness to the estate as a
claim "provable against the estate" within the meaning of
section 68b of the Bankruptcy Act. Compare Morgan
v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 35o; 55 L. R. A. 33.
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BILLS AND NOTES.

In B. B. Ford & Co. v. People's Bank of Orangeburg,
54 S. E. 204, the Supreme Court of South Carolina holds
to
Forgd Draft that to entitle the holder of a forged draft
retain the money obtained, he should be able to
show that the whole responsibility of determining the validity of the signature was on the drawee, and that the negligence of the drawee was not lessened by any disregard of
duty on the holder's part or by failure of any precaution
which from his assertion in presenting the draft as a sufficient voucher the drawee had the right to believe he had
taken. Compare Bank of United States v. Bank of Georgia,
io Wheaton 333-

BROKERS.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds in Jayne v.
Drake, 41 S. 372, that a contract without consideration by a
landowner, merely giving one the exclusive
agency for a year to sell the land on commisroat-,,
sion, may be revoked prior to a sale, being
without mutuality. Compare Kolb v. Land Co., 74 Miss.

CARRIERS.

In Cleveland City Ry. Co. v. Conner, 78 N. E. 376, the
Supreme Court of Ohio decides that a passenger on a street
railway, who has paid fare and is entitled to
ErrorinTidtkt ride over another line belonging to the same
company, and who, having asked for a transfer
ticket over such other line, is given, by mistake of the conductor, a transfer which is not good over such other line,
may, nevertheless, if he has exercised such care about the
receiving and making use of the transfer ticket as persons of
ordinary prudence are accustomed to exercise under the
same or similar circumstances, lawfully insist upon being
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CARRIERS (Continued.)

carried over such other line without further payment of
fare; and if such passenger, without fault on his part, is
ejected from a car for refusing to pay fare other than by
such transfer ticket, he may recover damages for the tort,
and cannot be restricted to damages for breach of the contract to carry him. See in connection herewith the very
recent cases of Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Baker,
54 S. E. 539 and Norton v. Consolidated Ry. Co., 63 Ad.
I087.

In Sullivan v. Southern Ry., 54 S. E. 586, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina decides that where a passenger
buys a ticket from a point on the carrier's line
Baggage
to a station on another line with which a connection is made at a junctional point, the carrier must
check the baggage to the point of destination and cannot
require the passenger to recheck at the junctional point.
In Atchison &c. Ry. Co. v. Bourdett, 85 Pac. 82o, it
appeared that a railway company received a shipment of
freight with the freight charges paid in adRefusal to
Deliver
vance. At the point of delivery its local agent
Freight
demanded payment by the consignor of additional freight charges under a different classification, and
also payment of a former freight bill which he conceived to
be due to the company from the same consignor for a
previous shipment of the same article, and refused to deliver
the shipment unless these additional sums were paid.
Under these facts the Supreme Court of Kansas decides that
in an action for damages the demand for payment of
charges for a former shipment and refusal to deliver unless
such demand was complied with render the withholding
unlawful, and preclude any inquiry into the merits of the
other demand, and the company is liable for the value of the
use of the shipment for the time it was unlawfully withheld.
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CARRIERS (Continued.)

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in International & G. N. R. Co. v. Addison, 93 S. W. io8i, that a
carrier failing to stop its train to permit plainStop T

tiff to board it is liable for the injuries received
by him while proceeding to his destination,
where he exercises ordinary care in choosing a means of
transportation and in the prosecution of his journey; and
where he procured a conveyance after the failure of a
train to stop to permit him to board it, he did not, as a
matter of law, assume the risk from injuries resulting from
exposure to the weather while making the trip by means of
the conveyance selected.

COMMERCE.

The United States Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois, decides
in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Reichman, 145
Fed. 235, that the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate commerce among the
Regulation
several states includes the power to regulate
freight rates by requiring that they shall be uniform to all
shippers, and in construingstatutes enacted to that end freight
rates shall be construed to mean the net cost to the shipper
of the transportation of his property, and such regulations
may lawfully apply not only to common carriers but to
all persons and corporations occupying such relation to
transportation that the conduct of their business may operate to impair uniformity of rates. It is therefore held
that a private car company which delivers its cars to
railroad companies to be furnished indiscriminately for
the use of shippers, receiving pay for such from the railroad company on a mileage basis, is within the regulating
powers of Congress.
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CONNECTING CARRIERS.

In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. et al. v. Nation & Slavens,
S. W. 823, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides
that where a shipment of cattle over the lines of
Settle-ent bycories
a
e, Cr,, connecting carriers was an interstate shipment,
and the liability of each carrier was limited by
contract to the damage occurring on its own line, so that
their liability was several and not joint, evidence of the
amount paid by one of the carriers in compromise of a
claim for damages resulting from its negligence was inadmissible in an action against the other carriers for injuries
to the cattle caused by their negligence.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

An important holding of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky appears in Berea College v. Commonwealth, 94 S. W.
623, where it is decided that a statute prohibitSchools for
ing and imposing a punishment for maintainWhite and
Colored Persons ing and operating an institution of learing in
which white and colored persons may be taught
at the same time and in the same place, is within the police
power, and valid; but that a prohibition against maintaining any institution of learning of separate and distinct
branches for white and colored persons less than twentyfive miles distant from each other is unreasonable and not
within the police power. One judge dissents. It seems not
improbable that this case will go to the Supreme Court of
the United States, as it undoubtedly upholds legislation
with respect to the separate education of the races more
far-reaching than has yet been sustained by that Court.
Compare Cisco v. School Board, i6i N. Y. 598, 48 L. R. A.
113.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi decides in Hyland v.
Sharp, 41 Southern 264, that a statute imposing a privilege
tax on those doing a money-lending business
Due Process
on personal securities, such as household furnitof Law
ure, wearing apparel, etc., is invalid as depriving one of property without due process of law, because it

OO
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued.)

arbitrarily fixes the basis of the tax on the kind of security.
Compare Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183.

CONTRACTS.

In Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 145 Fed. 358,
the United States Circuit Court, E. D. Kentucky, decides
that a system of contracts made by the manuoeTrant
.1i Trade

facturer of a proprietary medicine between him

and wholesale dealers, to whom alone he sold
his medicine, by which they were bound to sell only at a
certain price and to retail dealers designated by him, and
between him and the retail dealers by which, in consideration of being so designated, they agreed to sell to consumers only at a certain price, is not unlawful as in restraint
of trade, but is a reasonable provision for the protection
of the manufacturer's trade, and he is entitled to an injunction to restrain a defendant from inducing other parties
to such contracts to violate the same. The case presents a
very full and satisfactory discussion of property rights in
articles produced by secret process. Compare Bement v.
National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 7o6.
An interesting decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky appears in Clemons v. Meadows, 94 S. W. 13,
where it is held that a contract between competOelTrat

ing proprietors of hotels in a town whereby

one of them agreed to keep his hotel closed for
three years, reserving the right to rent the same for offices
and to roomers, and whereby the other agreed to pay a
specified sum monthly to the former during the three years,
is in restraint of trade and illegal, since a hotel is a
quasi-public institution and an agreement by a proprietor not
to perform a duty imposed on him by law is in contravention of public policy. The application of this ancient theory
of an innkeeper's business being a public calling seems
somewhat novel. Compare Chapin v. Brown, 48 N. W.
io74, 12 L. R. A.
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CORPORATIONS.

In Germer v. Triple-State &c. Co., 54 S. E. 5o9, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decides that
a stockholder in a corporation, who is present
and participates in a meeting of the stockholders
Meeting
thereof, is estopped to deny the legality of such
meeting. Compare Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417.

COURTS.

With two judges dissenting, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina decides in Coffin & McDonnel v. Harris,54 S. E.
437, that where property was attached in a
in
Proty
P1.oPm t.ln-suit against non-residents which was removed
to the federal courts, the property was in
custodia legis within the protection of the federal court,
so that the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain an
original action in the state court against residents of the
state to restrain waste on the property attached. Compare
-In

re Hall & Stilson Co., 73 Fed. 527.

In Harris v. Rosenberger, 145 Fed. 449, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, decides
Jurisdiction

that a suit, although not one of diversity of

citizenship, which, according to the complainant's bill, depends not only upon the construction and
application of the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutional validity of an act of Congress, but also upon
the proper construction of the act of Congress, is one in
respect of which the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is not exclusive, and an appeal from the final decree
may be taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Compare
Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397-
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CRIMINAL LAW.

In State v. Logan, 85 Pac. 798, the Supreme Court of
Kansas decides that an instruction, relating to the individual
responsibility of each juror in a criminal case,
DutyofJaror which implies that he is to act solely upon his
individual judgment, and is silent as to his duty
to consult with his fellow jurors, is erroneous.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.

In Mills' Adm'r v. Cavanaugh 94 S. W. 651, the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky decides that in an action by an
administrator for the death of an infant child,
Cohtributory contributory negligence of the parents in failgIfen

0r

ing to exercise in the care of decedent such

ordinary diligence as persons of ordinary prudence usually exercise in the care of children of decedent's
age, precludes recovery, where the amount sought to be
recovered would go to the parents.

DEEDS.

The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Jackson v. Jackson, 78 N. E. 19, that where a man deeded land to a woman
Consideration in consideration of marriage, and her promise
to be a kind and dutiful wife, but she failed
to so conduct herself, there was but a partial failure of consideration, and equity would not decree rescission as the
wife could not be put in statu quo. Compare Hursen v.
Hursen, 212 Ill. 377.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

The Supreme Court of Georgia decides in Atlantic & B.
Ry. Co. v. McKnight, 54 S. E. 148, that the construction
and operation of a railway in a public street is
Rltrods
a physical invasion of the easement of access
of abutting landowners, and is a damage to the property,
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EMINENT DOMAIN (Continued.)

within the meaning of the constitutional provision which
declares that private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation being first paid.
Compare Austin v. Terminal Ry. Co., 34 S. E. 852, 47
L. R. A. 755.

EVIDENCE.

The Supreme Court of Vermont decides in Phelps v.
Admisions
Root, 63 Atl. 941, that the price at which a
person offers to sell property is as against him
evidence of its value.

In Gilliand v. Board of Education, &c., 54 S. E. 413, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that upon an issue
as to whether certain persons were of pure
white blood or of African descent, evidence
eption
that one of their ancestors voted at a time when
colored people were not allowed to vote was admissible as
tending to show general reputation that the ancestor was a
white person. Compare Bryan v. Walton, 20 Ga. 48o.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Against the dissent of two judges, the Supreme Court of
Kansas decides in Nagle v. Tieperman, 85 Pac. 941 that a
wife, not being in possession or receiving the
Taxation
rents and not being under any other legal or
moral obligation to pay taxes, may acquire a title to land
owned by her husband and others by purchase at a sale for
taxes or by purchasing a tax sale certificate; provided, such
purchase is made in good faith and with her own money.
Compare Munger v. Baldridge, 41 Kansas 236.
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INSURANCE.

The Supreme Court of Colorado decides in American
Bonding & Trust Company of Baltimore v. Burke, 85 Pac.
692, that an instrument executed by a surety

company indemnifying an, employer against
larceny or embezzlement by an employee, though
denominated a bond is in legal effect analogous to a policy
of insurance, and therefore the rules applicable to insurance
policies should be applied in construing it so that it will be
construed in favor of the insured, and statements or declarations by the insured will be regarded as representations, and
not warranties, unless the contract makes them so. Compare
Rice v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., lO3 Fed. 427.

JUDGMENT.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in Woodman v.
Blue Grass Land Company, 107 N. W. 1052, that a final
judgment in a former action to recover the
Res
Juacaft
earnest money paid, pursuant to a contract for
the purchase of land, is not a bar to a subsequent action between the same parties to recover damages in deceit for
fraudulently inducing the plaintiff to enter into that contract
and for subsequent, fraudulent representations in connection
with its title. Compare Wanzer v. De Baum, i E. D. Smith
262.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Sapp v. Elkins,
54 S. E. 98, that when a contract creating the relation of
landlord and tenant embraces a sum to be paid

as rent of land, and another sum as hire of
animals to be used on the rented premises, the whole sum
due is rent, and may be collected by distress. Compare
Lathrop v. Clewis, 63 Ga. 282.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT (Continued.)

In McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103, the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, decides that
a tenant under a lease, while having no absolute
w-, of
right to a renewal as against the landlord, in
the absence of provision therefor, has a reasonable expectancy of renewal which is regarded in equity as
property, and, if one standing in a fiduciary relation to him
secures a renewal to himself, a court of equity will treat
him as holding the new lease in trust for the original lessee.
This rule is applied to the case where an officer of a corporation in charge of the premises leased organized a new corporation and procured a lease of such premises for such new
corporation, it being held that such action was a clear breach
of his duty to the old corporation and to the stockholders
thereof, giving them right to redress. Compare Robinson
v. Jewett, i 6 N. Y. 40.
LIMITATIONS.

In Scallon v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 78 N. E. 284, the Court
of Appeals of New York holds that where infancy exists
when a cause of action accrues, the time for
Ss.1t.n
commencing the action is extended for a certain
period after the infant becomes of age; but, if
the statute has already begun to run against the ancestor,
it is not interrupted by his death and the supervening disability of his infant heirs, in the absence of provisions to
the contrary. Compare Lewis v. New York & Harlem
R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 202.
MORTGAGES.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Libbey
v. Tidden, 78 N. E. 313, holds that where one entered into
an agreement for the erection of a building on
a lot of which he was not then the owner, but
Sewn

O

which he afterwards purchased, and a deed to

him and the mortgage by him on the lot were
delivered simultaneously, in order to render his seisin in-
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MORTGAGES (Continued.)

stantaneous in law, so as to prevent a mechanic's lien from
attaching prior to the mortgage, the deed and the mortgage
must have been part of the same transaction. Compare Holbrooke v. Finney, 4 Mass. 566.

With three judges dissenting the Court of Appeals of
New York decides in Howue v. Carr, 78 N. E. I7I, that
though limitations have run against a mortgage

Foreclosure;

a court of equity will not restrain a sale under

the power of sale contained in the mortgage.
With this decision compare Hulbertv. Clark, 128 N. Y. 295,
14 L. R. A. 59.

NEGLIGENCE.

An important rule is laid down by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Delahunt v. United Telephone & Telegraph
Company, 215 Pa. 241, where it is held that in
Res lpsloqultur

an action to recover damages for the death of a

person killed by an electric current from a telephone on his
premises, the rule res ipsa loquiturapplies, and this notwithstanding the fact that the deadly current was not generated
by the telephone company. Though the wire which connects with a telephone, says the court, is intended to conduct
only a harmless current of electricity, the telephone company is bound to know that it can become the conductor of
a deadly one, and that such a current will pass over it if it is
not properly insulated and should come in contact with a wire
heavily and dangerously charged. It is as much the duty of
the telephone company to see that no such current shall
thus pass over its wires as it is to send only a harmless one
from its own exchange. Compare Alexander v. Nanticoke
209 Pa. 571.

Light Co.,
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RAILROADS.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Railroad
Com'rs v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 54 S. E. 224, that
where the railroad commissioners have determined that the accommodations furnished
Regulations:
Stopping
citizens of the state at a station in the state by an
Trains
interstate railroad company are inadequate, its
order requiring the company to stop two of its fast mail
trains transporting interstate passengers at such station on
flagging is not a burden on interstate commerce, and mandamus will issue to compel the trains so to stop, the writ being
so framed as to give the railroad company the alternative
right to provide facilities substantially the same as would be
afforded the people at such station by stopping the fast mail
trains on flag. Compare Lake Shore Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S.
285.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, decides in Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145
Fed. 617, that where one railroad company conConnetng
Lines

trols others through the ownership of their stock

and operates the lines of all as a single system,
though the general management of each road is retained by
the corporation owning it, the relation between the dominant
and subordinate companies with respect to traffic originating on the lines of the former is that of principal and agent,
and the dominant company is directly liable for an injury
to one employed in unloading one of its own cars on the
tracks of a subordinate company through the negligence of
the employees of the latter. Compare Lehigh Railroad Co.
v. Dupont, 138 Fed. 84o.
RECORDING ACTS.

In Burns v. Ross, 215 Pa. 293, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decides that when it is commonly known that
certain first, or Christian, names are interchangeNames:
ably used, and the initial and dominant letters
Christian
Names
of each are identical, indicating to the eye that
they are the same, and giving the same sound and substance

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
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to each, the judgment index must be searched for each; the
rule being applied to the particular case where a decedent's
name was Francis Ross and the court holding that a purchaser from his heirs is bound to look for liens indexed in
his lifetime against Frank Ross. Compare Crouse v.
Murphy, 14o Pa. 335TELEGRAMS.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Roberts
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 53 S. E. 985, that where
a telegram is received outside of office hours by
an operator who happens to be in the office,
.uy.,n
which announces the serious illness of a relative,
and death occurs before succeeding office hours, the telegraph company is not liable for mental anguish caused by
not being with deceased before his death. Compare Bonner
v. Telephone Co., 71 S. C. 303.

